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Abstract: This paper analyzes the impact of international capital mobility on
redistributive capital taxation and on lobbying activities by interest groups. It
employs a model where different capital endowments lead to a conflict between
households concerning their most preferred capital tax rate. Three main results are
derived: First, redistributive source based capital taxes or subsidies decline as
international tax competition intensifies. Second, lobbying activities of certain
interest groups may explain international differences in the capital tax rate. Third,
capital mobility may lead to declining lobbying activities of interest groups and thus
may be welfare increasing for all households.
Keywords: Tax competition, interest groups, redistribution
JEL-classification: F 42, H 77Introduction*
This paper analyzes capital tax competition in a model with endogenous policy
formation and interest groups. In an open economy with internationally mobile
capital, investors have the possibility to transfer their capital to the country offering
the most favorable investment conditions. This opportunity leads to an additional
constraint for national tax policy:
l capital that is taxed heavily in the country where
it is invested may escape to other countries with a lower tax burden. Governments
then have to compete for this internationally mobile capital as a tax base.
In the last years ah extensive theoretical literature has developed that investigates
many aspects of interjurisdictional tax competition caused by capital mobility. This
literature usually deals with capital taxes raised entirely for allocative reasons,
namely to finance public goods or services that the private sector cannot ade-
quately provide.
 2 As one of the main results, it implies that tax competition
between sufficiently similar countries leads to declining source-based capital taxes
and therefore either lower levels of public spending or higher taxes on immobile
* A preliminary version of this paper has been presented at the 6th Silvaplana Workshop
on Political Economy, 1995. I thank participants of this workshop for their helpful
comments and suggestions. This paper draws on some results of my doctoral thesis,
entitled "Standortwettbewerb bei internationaler Kapitalmobilitat - Eine modelltheore-
tische Untersuchung". Financial support by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft is
gratefully acknowledged.
1 Capital taxation is only one domain where international capital mobility may lead to
competition between governments or other national institutions. For a general descrip-
tion of institutional competition caused by international capital mobility, sec e.g.
Siebert, Koop (1990).
2 Examples are the works of Zodrow, Mieszkowski (1986), Wilson (1986), Bucovetsky,
Wilson (1991), Wildasin (1989), Oates, Schwab (1988, 1991) and Razin, Sadka
(1991a, 1991b).-2-
factors compared to a closed economy.
3 Since governments are predominantly
assumed to maximize the welfare of their respective representative citizen, capital
tax competition with a source-based capital tax is usually viewed as inefficient. A
coordination of national tax policies would then increase welfare of all households
in all countries.
4
In contrast to the literature on tax competition with allocative capital taxes, this
paper focuses on redistributive capital taxation. The better a household is endowed
with capital, the more a declining net interest rate caused by rising capital taxes
affects his factor income.
5 Different capital endowments of the households there-
fore lead to a redistributional conflict concerning the desired capital tax, that can-
3 Bucovetsky, Wilson (1991) and Razin, Sadka (1991a) show that this result holds as
long as residence-based capital taxes cannot be raised adequately in addition to source-
based capital taxes.
4 In contrast to the assumption of purely welfare maximizing governments, Edwards,
Keen (1994) and Rauscher (1996) investigate tax competition in a "Leviathan" model of
the government (see also S. Sinn, 1992). They reach ambiguous conclusions concerning
the welfare effects of tax competition with international capital mobility.
5 Ghosh (1991), Persson, Tabellini (1992) and Schulze (1996) also treat tax competition
with redistributive capital taxes. Ghosh (1991) combines a model of tax competition
with allocative capital taxes with an overlapping generations approach where redistri-
butional conflicts arise between young households, who earn labor income and save for
their retirement, and old households, who live entirely from the capital income of past
savings. Assuming an exogenously given political objective function, he shows that
capital mobility no longer leads to unambiguously decreasing capital taxes. Schulze
(1996) considers a tax on capital exports in a model where the tax proceeds are dis-
tributed between households according to their share of total factor income. With these
assumptions, he shows that the most preferred tax rate of a certain household depends
on his capital-labor endowment ratio. The model and the results of Persson, Tabellini
(1992) are treated in section 2 below.-3-
not be treated in representative household models.
6 Households with a low capital
endowment prefer a relatively high capital tax rate compared to households rela-
tively well endowed with capital preferring a lower capital tax rate or even a capital
subsidy. The capital tax rate that is actually imposed then depends on the degree to
which the respective interests of the different households are represented in the
process of political decision making.
As section 2 of this paper shows, tax competition with source-based capital taxes
leads to declining redistribution between households differing with respect to their
capital endowment. As tax competition intensifies, a positive capital tax rate,
redistributing from capital rich to capital poor households, declines and a negative
capital tax rate, redistributing in the other direction, rises. With a redistributional
impact of capital taxes, tax competition can no longer be viewed as unambiguously
welfare decreasing for all households. Those households who suffer from the
redistnbutive activities of the government may benefit from the declining degree of
redistribution.
The redistributional impact of capital taxes may give households an incentive to
influence policy not only through their vote decision but also through lobbying
pressure by interest groups. To shed some light on the mutual relations between
lobbying and tax competition, this paper explicitly considers lobbying by interest
groups in a model of representative democracy. Two main results follow from this
investigation: First, as section 2 shows, lobbying by certain interest groups may
have an influence on the relative position of a country in the international tax com-
petition game. A relatively high political representation of interest groups that pur-
sue the interests of capital poor households leads to a relatively high capital tax
6 In addition to the case of unequal capital endowments, redistributional conflicts con-
nected with capital taxation in an open economy may also arise from an unequal distri-
bution of immobile factors or from a capital tax that is used to finance redistributional
expenditure programs.-4-
rate in this respective country and therefore causes capital outflows to other
countries.
Second, international capital mobility has consequences for lobbying activities by
interest groups. As redistributional conflicts between households with different
capital endowments diminish with the introduction of international capital mobility,
also the incentives decline for interest groups to influence tax policy through lobby-
ing. Section 3 shows that for certain symmetry conditions the lobbying expendi-
tures of all interest groups decrease as international tax competition intensifies.
Thus, international capital mobility has welfare implications that,have not been
treated at all in the existing literature on tax competition: International tax compe-
tition may lead to a declining amount of resources invested in lobbying and may
therefore increase welfare of all households.
1. Redistributive Capital Taxation in an Open Economy
This section provides a basis for analyzing tax competition with redistributive
capital taxation using a simple neoclassical representation of an international capital
market equilibrium. It shows how source-based capital taxes influence the alloca-
tion of internationally mobile capital and how they affect the remuneration of capi-
tal and that of immobile factors. As was mentioned in the introduction, the redistri-
butive effects of capital taxes follow from an unequal distribution of capital
between households. The last part of this section shows that the redistributive
impact of a capital tax continuously declines with the introduction of capital mobil-
ity and with a rising number of countries.
According to the model, the world consists of N countries. A representative firm
has the possibility to produce in each of these countries the same internationally
tradable composite commodity. The firm takes the prices of the good and that of
production factors as given. Production factors are internationally perfectly mobile-5-
capital and internationally immobile labor.
7 The firm produces with constant
returns to scale. It chooses its capital input fC and its labor input V to maximize its








In this equation, the price of the composite commodity is normalized to 1. The
term W denotes the wage rate as the price of the immobile factor in country i
whereas p measures the interest rate as the price of capital. Capital mobility equal-
izes the price of capital internationally. In addition to the factor prices, the firm has
to pay a constant capital tax rate t
l in every country for the amount of capital
invested there. This capital tax rate represents an aggregate measure of the burden
of source based capital taxes. It depicts the difference between the gross capital
return realized in one country and the net return arriving at the household level.
8 A
negative t' corresponds to a net capital subsidy in country i. The factor employ-
ment decision of the representative firm determines capital and labor demand in
every country.
In each country, there exist n households. Every household supplies inelastically /
units of labor. Aggregate savings of the households determine capital supply. The
households save to maximize utility from present and future consumption. Present
consumption of a household k equals the difference between an exogenous income
7 Labor can be interpreted as a representation of all internationally immobile factors.
8 Since this model does not differentiate between international capital movements on the
firm level and on the household level, a source-based capital tax raised from the house-
holds would influence the capital market equilibrium in the same way as the investment
tax considered here. The linear capital tax equalizes the so called "tax-wedge" intro-
duced by King, Fullerton (1984) to estimate the burden of capital taxation.-6-
vk minus savings sk. Future consumption equals the sum of factor income from
capital and labor and each household's share of the public income from the taxation
of capital. This paper assumes that a positive or negative public income from the
capital tax or subsidy is distributed directly and equally as a lump sum transfer
among the households. The savings decision of a household k in country i thus can
be represented as follows:
vi-4.4ri + pl+w
l/ + -—-I. (2)
In equilibrium, households maximize their utility and the representative firm
maximizes its profit. Worldwide aggregate capital supply through savings equals
capital demand of the representative firm. Moreover, in each country aggregate la-
bor supply equals labor demand. Thus, the following equations describe the equi-
librium on the world capital market (i=l...N, k=l...ri):
9
\nl)-t
l' =l + p , (3)
w
i , (4)
= l + p, (5)
9 As long as the marginal rate of substitution between present and future consumption is
sufficiently high as s^ approaches zero and the marginal product of capital is suffi-
ciently high as K
1 approaches zero, an interior solution for the capital market equilib-
rium exists. It also meets the conditions for local dynamic stability (see appendix a).-7-
N n . N ,.-. , ... .. .,,. ... :
4IK
1 (6)
These equations determine the effects of a source-based capital tax on the aggre-
gate capital stock of the world and its international allocation. The impact of an
increasing domestic capital tax rate can be derived with the additional assumption
of a utility function separable between present and future consumption and exhib-
iting constant absolute risk aversion (see appendix a). Starting from a symmetric
equilibrium where all countries choose the same capital tax rate, a marginal
increase of the domestic capital tax rate affects the domestic and foreign capital







1 NF with-l<w<0. (8)
n
The term \\f stands for the marginal impact of an increasing capital tax rate on the
domestic interest rate before an international relocation of capital takes place. This
term is negative implying a negative relationship between the capital tax rate and
the net return to capital in a closed economy. Since an increasing capital tax
decreases aggregate savings in a closed economy, the term \|r is larger than minus
one.
!
1 In an open economy, the impact of the domestic tax rate on the net return
1
0 The adjuncts 1 and -1 denote the domestic country arid a representative foreign country
respectively.
1
1 Aggregate savings decrease with a rising capital tax rate, because the capital tax raises
the relative price of future consumption and thereby causes a substitution from future
consumption to present consumption. In addition to this substitution effect, an increas-
ing capital tax also causes an income effect on individual savings depending on whetherto capital causes an international relocation of capital. The invested capital stock in
country 1 therefore decreases to a larger extent in an open economy (N> 1) than
in a closed economy (N = 1). This follows from equation (7), that implies that the
absolute value of the domestic capital reaction on a changing domestic tax rate
increases with the number of competing countries.
The degree to which the capital stock reacts on a changing tax rate determines the
incidence of the capital tax for the income of both factors capital and labor. With
international capital mobility, a changing capital tax rate affects the income of the
mobile factor capital to a lower degree than in a closed economy; the converse is
true for the immobile factor. With a rising number of competing countries, the bur-
den of the capital tax shifts more and more from the mobile factor capital to the
immobile factor labor. In the limit case, where the number of countries approaches
infinity, the interest rate is not affected at all by a unilateral change of the domestic
capital tax rate whereas domestic labor bears all the consequences for net factor
incomes.
1
2 These results can be derived from equations (3) and (4). Total







the household benefits from or is burdened by the redistributional effect of capital taxes
at the margin. The different income effects on individual savings, however, cancel out in
the aggregate for an individual utility function that exhibits constant absolute risk aver-
sion, so that only the substitution effect remains in the aggregate.
1
2 In the limit case, the model therefore resembles that of a small open economy where the
interest rate is fixed exogenously. Me Lure (1969), for example, examines the incidence
• of fiscal policy in a small open economy.-9-
An increasing domestic fiscal burden then has the following impact on the interest
rate and on domestic wages:
dt
l Ful A
With its influences on factor incomes, the redistributional effect of a capital tax or
subsidy can now be derived. According to its exogenous income in the first period,
each household belongs to one of the household groups j = \...m,m <n. The
better a household is endowed with exogenous income in the first period, the
higher are its savings.
1
3 Thus, the endowment of a household with exogenous
income in the first period determines its endowment with savings capital. For a
given amount of savings, an increasing domestic capital tax rate affects future con-
sumption of a household in group j according to the following equation:
1
4




x n n dt
l
With equations (7), (11) and (12), equation (13) can be expressed as follows:
1
3 A higher value of the exogenous income V leads to higher savings, if future consump-
tion is a normal good with respect to an increasing lifetime income. The assumption of a
utility function separable between present and future consumption ensures this condi-
tion to be satisfied.
1
4 The increasing capital tax rate also affects present and future consumption through its
impact on individual savings. However, this effect is not relevant for the utility of





In a closed economy and in an open country where all countries choose the same
fiscal policy, average domestic savings equate the capital stock invested per head.
The first term in equation (14) then measures the redistributional effect of a capital
tax. This term is positive for all household groups whose members save less than
the average. These households prefer a positive tax, whereas the opposite is true
for relatively capital abundant households. With a rising number of countries the
redistributional impact of a capital tax declines.
2. Tax Competition when Lobbying Influence is Given
This section derives the equilibrium rate of a redistributive capital tax for a closed
and for an open economy. It thus shows how international capital mobility and tax
competition affect redistributive capital taxation. As the proceeding section has
shown, the redisributive effects of a capital tax lead to conflicting interests between
households differing according to their capital endowment. Interest groups of these
households therefore may exert political pressure through lobbying to influence
capital taxation in their favoured direction. In the last part of this section the effects
are derived of an increasing political influence of certain interest groups on capital
tax rates. These effects determine the impact of lobbying on redistributive capital
taxation in an open economy.
To represent the process of political decision-making, this paper employs a prob-
abilistic voting approach with interest groups developed by Coughlin, Mueller,
Murell (1990a, 1990b). It describes a political contest between two parties trying
to maximize the expected number of votes in a forthcoming election. Both parties
announce simultaneously their respective policy platform. Afterwards, all house--11-
holds vote in a majority-rule election for one of the parties. The winning party then
enforces its policy platform.'
5
Coughlin, Mueller, Murell (1990 a, 1990 b) divide the electorate into different
groups of equal households - the interest groups. The parties are assumed to be
only incompletely informed about the political preferences of the members of these
interest groups, so that the median voter theorem does not hold. Instead, parties
choose their respective policy platform as if they would maximize a weighted sum
of indirect utilities of the interest groups' representative members - with strictly
positive weights for all interest groups. The weight of an interest group in the
political objective function depends positively on its size and negatively on the
degree to which the parties are uncertain about political preferences of the mem-
bers of this interest group. The uncertainty of the parties is represented by a per-
sonal bias term measuring the utility bias of a household j in favour of one of the
parties. This term is assumed to be distributed uniformly on an interval with size
In addition to Coughlin, Mueller, Murell (1990a, 1990b), this paper assumes that
the parties do not expect systematic preferences in favor of one of the parties, and
that both parties possess the same degree of uncertainty conclOOerning the voters'
preferences. Both parties then announce exacdy the same capital tax rate in equi-
librium and the outcome of the election is not relevant for the tax rate actually
1
5 Thus, the model abstracts from time inconsistency and enforcement problems where the
policy platform announced by a party before an election differs from the policy actually
carried out by the winner of the election.- 12-
raised.
1
6 Elections occur simultaneously in all countries.
1
7 Then the equilibrium
capital tax rate t in country I is chosen to maximize the following objective func-
tion, with n; as the size of interest group j, S; as utility maximizing savings of
household j, and /"" as the vector of equilibrium capital tax rates abroad.
)j}}[ p] (15)
with
The following first order condition characterizes an interior symmetric equilibrium





l, K = K
l = K~
l and ©_,- =w)=O)f.
It is assumed that the objective function (15) is strictly concave in t wherever
condition (16) is satisfied so that condition (16) suffices for an interior symmetric
1
6 Note, that the capital tax rate is the only variable considered here as an instrument of
the parties in the political contest.
1
7 Coughlin, Mueller, Murell (1990a, 1990b) have formulated their political model only
for a closed country.- 13-
Bibiiofhefe
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equilibrium. The equilibrium is also assumed to be stable.
1
8 Rearranging equation
(16) leads to the following explicit expression for the capital tax rate in equilib-
rium:
t > ' r K~\





Equation (18) shows that the marginal utilities of future consumption and the wel-
fare weights CO ,• of the interest groups in the political objective function determine
whether capital is taxed or subsidized in equilibrium. For a constant marginal utility
of future consumption, capital is taxed, if households with relatively low savings
are represented more than proportionally to their size in the political objective
function. A less than proportional political representation of these households leads
to a capital subsidy. More precisely, as the expression below shows, capital is
taxed (subsidized), if aggregate savings of the representative members of the dif-
ferent interest groups j=l...m, weighted with the relative political weight tor , are
smaller (larger) than aggregate savings weighted with the relative size nr of the
interest groups. For an equal degree of uncertainty concerning the preferences of
all interest groups' representative members, and a constant marginal utility of future
consmption, the relative political weight of all interest groups equals their relative
1
8 In a static game like this, stability has no real meaning, because the equilibrium is
reached immediately and not - as the notion of stability implies - in a dynamic process
where actors behave myopically. However, the assumption of stability is necessary to
obtain "plausible" comparative static results in the following analysis.- 14-
size. The capital tax rate then takes the value of zero. A declining marginal utility
of future consumption works in the direction of a higher capital tax rate.
t > (<) 0 if and only if S® r/7 <
j
(0: n j
with (0r, = ——, nri = —. and U,• (•}. = const. J £(0
 n
The first order condition (16) is the central equation for studying the effects of tax
competition on equilibrium policy. Implicit derivation of this equation first shows
how the number of competing countries influences the capital tax rate:
iU-*£. (i8)
dN x,
The expression xt measures the effects on x of a marginal increase of the capital






with a = ^—-<0 and b& -i —I.
dt
l
Stability of the equilibrium implies a ± [N -1] b < 0 (see Dixit, 1986). The term
xt is therefore negative. The following equation gives the value of x^:
N
2- 15-
A rising number of countries decreases a positive capital tax rate and increases a
negative one. Capital mobility thus limits redistribution between households differ-
ing with respect to their capital endowment: In a closed country there is more
redistributive capital taxation than in an open country and in an open country
redistributive capital taxation declines continuously with a rising number of coun-
tries. Proposition 1 summarizes this result:
Proposition 1: Assume that (i) the capital tax rate maximizes equation (15) for all
countries, that (ii) utility is separable with respect to present and future consump-
tion and exhibits constant absolute risk aversion, and that (Hi) the tax competition
equilibrium is stable and symmetric. Then the absolute value of the capital tax
rate decreases with a rising number of countries.
Persson, Tabellini (1992) derive a similar result concerning redistributive capital
taxes and capital mobility: They investigate capital taxation in a 2-period, 2-coun-
try model where capital investments abroad cause strictly convex mobility costs. In
their model, tax-competition intensifies as marginal mobility costs decline. In a
symmetric equilibrium, this leads to a decreasing absolute value of capital tax rates
- comparable to the results derived above. However, Persson, Tabellini (1992)
employ a simpler economic framework where capital is used as the only input in a
linear storage technology. Furthermore, the political part of their model differs
substantially from the one formulated here, since redistributional activity is not ex-
plained by the pressure of certain interest groups in the political contest. Instead, in
their model the elected policymaker chooses the capital tax to maximize his own
income that consistis of capital income and public transfers - comparable to the
income of any other household.
Equation (16) not only shows how capital mobility and tax competition affect the
degree of redistributive capital taxation, it also determines the influence of lobbying
on capital taxes in equilibrium. In this paper it is assumed that lobbying of interest
groups affects equilibrium tax policy through its effects on the welfare weights in
the political objective function (15). Through lobbying, each interest group can- 16-
increase the weight of its members in the political objective function.
1
9 An increas-
ing, weight of a single interest group in one country has the following effects on




1 _ a+[N-2)b (21)
d(o\
(22)
The stability condition a ± [iV - \\b< 0 and the condition a < 0 together imply
that a + [N - \\b < 0, a - b < 0, and a + [N - 2]b < 0. An increasing weight
of interest group k then will increase domestic fiscal burden, if and only if it
increases x. The sign of b determines the foreign reaction on a changing fiscal bur-
den in the domestic economy. For a positive b, domestic and foreign fiscal policies
are strategic complements. An increasing domestic fiscal burden then leads to an
increasing fiscal burden abroad, though the foreign tax rate rises by a smaller
amount than the domestic tax rate. The impact of the weight of an interest group k
on the first order condition is given by the following equation:
Inserting equation (17) gives the following expression:
J
9, Section 3 coasiders the influence of lobbying on political decision-making in more de-
tail.
2
0 These equations are derived in appendix b.- 17-
,
*co* >(<)0,ifandonlyif ^(OjVhsk <(>)2>/tfy2^-
For an interpretation of this result, assume that initially all households are weighted
equally in the respective political objective function of every country and that
marginal utility of future consumption is constant. In this initial equilibrium, the
capital tax rate takes the value of zero in all countries. Then the domestic tax rate
rises with an increasing weight of an interest group whose members save less than
the average. Figure 1 depicts this for the case of two countries. With the special
assumptions made above, the second order condition and the stability condition are
both satisfied and domestic and foreign tax rates are strategic complements (see
appendix c). An increasing weight of a capital poor interest group moves up the
reaction function of the representative domestic party. The domestic capital tax
rate rises and this causes also a rising capital tax rate abroad. Since the change of
the domestic capital tax rate exceeds that of the capital tax rate abroad, the politi-
cal influence of the capital poor interest group leads to capital outflows.
Proposition 2: Given the assumptions of Proposition 1, an increasing weight of
an interest group in the political objective function leads to an increasing domes-
tic capital tax rate, if and only if the aggregate difference is negative between per-
capita savings of the interest group's representative member and of the represen-
tative members of all other interest groups - weighted with marginal utility and
the political weights of the respective interest groups.-18-
Figure 1 - Reaction Functions and the Influence of Interest Groups
3. Endogenous Lobbying and Tax Competition
International capital mobility not only affects the capital tax rate for a given lobby-
ing influence of the interest groups but it may also have consequences for the lob-
bying process itself. The proceeding section has shown that redistributional capital
taxes or subsidies decline as the intensity of tax competition rises. In addition, the
weight of an interest group in the political objective function has a lower marginal
impact on the first order condition of the representative party. This section investi-
gates, whether this also leads to declining lobbying activities of the interest groups.
It therefore considers an entirely new aspect concerning the welfare effects of
international capital tax competition: As tax competition limits the ability of
governments to redistribute between households with differing capital endow--19-
merits, it may even increase welfare of all households, since it partly keeps them
from investing resources for lobbying by interest groups.
This paper considers lobbying as a process of information transmission: The politi-
cal weight of an interest group j depends negatively on the range of die parties'
uncertainty tyj concerning the political preferences of the households in this
group. All interest groups are assumed to possess perfect knowledge about the
political preferences of their members. Therefore, the interest groups have an
incentive to transmit their private knowledge through lobbying activities to the
parties and thereby increase their respective weight in the political objective func-
tion. The transmission of information is assumed to be costly with a differentiable
cost function c((j),j, that is mohotonically decreasing in <{>;, j = l..,m. In an
interior equilibrium, each interest group in each country devotes resources in the
lobbying process up to the point where the marginal benefit for its representative
household of decreasing §j equals the household's share of the marginal costs of
lobbying. Both, marginal benefit and marginal cost are measured in utility terms.
For the remainder of this paper, it is assumed that the utility of the households is
linear with respect to future consumption. Then a changing capital tax rate or
changing lobbying costs will not affect the marginal utility of future consumption,
Uj , of all representative households. The first order conditions can be repre-
dB)




The second order condition and the condition for stability of the lobbying equilib-
rium are assumed to be satisfied. Capital mobility and the intensity of tax competi-
tion affect lobbying through their impact on the marginal benefit of lobbying. The-20-
following equation represents the marginal benefit for a representative household









As equation (26) shows, the interest groups not only obey the impact of their
activities on domestic capital taxes in an open economy but also on capital taxes
abroad. The relations between an increasing political weight and the capital tax rate
at home and abroad are given by equations (21) and (22) of the proceeding section.
The following equations (27) and (28) show how an increasing capital tax rate at





In the following, the paper only considers those cases where the respective capital
endowment of the representative household is distributed symmetrically between
the interest groups. Symmetrical distribution of the capital endowment means that
for each interest group whose representative member owns a capital endowment
above the average, there exists another interest group of the same size with a rep-
resentative member owning a capital endowment below the average. The distance
between its representative member's endowment and average endowment is the
same for both interest groups. In addition, the linear utility of future consumption
implies that savings are distributed exactly in the same way across the households-21 -
as exogenous capital endowment,
2
1 and that the marginal utility of future con-
sumption takes the same value for all households. The following analysis will show
that the equilibrium lobbying outlays of interest groups can be ordered in pairs in
the same way as the distance between capital endowment and average capital
endowment. Governments then have no incentive to raise a redistributive capital
tax or subsidy and as equation (17) implies, the capital tax rate declines to zero
irrespective of the number of countries. However, for every interest group, there
remains an incentive to influence policy through lobbying, so that its lobbying out-
lays are strictly positive. Lobbying becomes a prisoners' dilemma situation for the
interest groups: Each interest group devotes resources to influence policy, but
because all interest groups do this in a symmetrical pattern, lobbying has no effects
at all on equilibrium policy.
For t-0 both equations (27) and (28) coincide and a changing capital tax rate
affects the utility of a representative household k irrespective of the country in
which the household resides. A household with a capital endowment below the
average thus benefits from increasing capital taxes raised in any foreign country in
the same way as from increasing domestic capital taxes.
For a constant marginal utility of future consumption and a symmetrically distrib-
uted capital endowment, both stability conditions for the tax competition equilib-
rium are satisfied (see appendix c). The domestic capital tax rate thus increases
with a rising weight of an interest group representing capital poor households and
decreases with a rising weight of an interest group representing capital abundant
households. Inserting equations (21), (22), (27) and (28) in equation (26) leads to
the following expression for the marginal benefit of lobbying:
2
1 Equation (5) shows that, with a linear utility of future consumption, all households con-
sume the same amount in ihe first period. Differences in their capital endowments are





The following equation determines xt for a constant marginal utility of future con-
sumption and for t = 0:
.(30)
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Equation (31) implies that the marginal benefit of lobbying does not directly
depend on the capital endowment of its representative household but only on the
distance between that capital endowment and average capital endowment. The
marginal benefits of lobbying thus can be ordered in pairs according to the distance
between the capital endowment of its representative member and average capital
endowment. The impact of tax competition on the marginal benefit of lobbying is
given by the following equation. This equation shows how an increasing number of
countries affects the marginal benefit of lobbying:
2
2
22 Because t = 0 irrespective of N, an increase in iV does affect neither t nor s^, K, \|/
nor F| i. Therefore, these expressions can be treated as constants.-23-
K'
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The marginal benefit of lobbying decreases continuously with an increasing number
of countries N. Lobbying becomes less attractive for every interest group as the
number of countries rises, and - as equation (25) implies - lobbying outlays
decrease.
Proposition 3: Assume that (i) the capital tax rate maximizes equation (15) for
given interest group weights and that the tax competition equilibrium is symmet-
ric, that (ii) utility is separable with respect to present and future consumption
and linear in future consumption, that (Hi) all interest groups have the same lob-
bying cost function, that (iv) capital endowment is distributed symmetrically
across all households in the respective countries, and that (v) the lobbying equi-
librium is stable. Then the capital tax rate is zero irrespective of the number of
countries and lobbying activities of all interest groups decline as the number of
countries rises.
So far, the impact of capital mobility on the lobbying activities has been derived
under the special assumptions of a linear utility of future consumption, symmetri-
cally distributed capital endowments and equal lobbying cost functions for all inter-
est groups. For a large number of countries, these assumptions are not necessary to
derive the negative impact of capital mobility on lobbying for capital income
redistribution.
2
3 As equation (17) shows, the capital tax rate declines to zero for a
sufficiently large number of countries, irrespective of the political weights of the
different interest groups. In this case, lobbying completely loses its influence on the
2
3 This case resembles the case of a small open economy.-24-
capital tax rate in an open economy. Since lobbying is costly at the margin, lobby-
ing outlays will then decline to zero.
Concluding Remarks
This paper has shown how tax competition caused by international capital mobility
may limit redistributional activities of governments and therefore may lead to a
declining amount of resources spent for lobbying by interest groups. It thus has
drawn a contrasting picture to the majority of the existing literature on interna-
tional tax competition and its potential welfare implications. This literature
abstracts from redistributional conflicts focusing on capital taxes raised for entirely
allocative purposes. In reality, capital taxes have both allocative and distributive
effects, so that a combination of the results derived here and those of the models of
allocative tax competition probably describes international capital tax competition
most accurately. An evaluation of the needs to coordinate tax policy internationally
should thus also bear the contrasting welfare implications of both kinds of models
in mind.
To reduce the complexity of the problem investigated here and to isolate main
driving forces of redistributive capital tax competition, the paper has focused on a
symmetric tax equilibrium. An exception of the symmetry assumption has been the
comparative static analysis in section 2, showing how internationally different tax
rates may reflect internationally different interest group activities. As another rea-
son for asymmetries, Bucovetsky (1991) and Wilson (1991) incorporate different
population sizes of the countries in a model with allocative capital taxation. Small
countries face a more elastic reaction of the capital stock on a changing tax rate
and therefore raise a lower allocative capital tax rate than large countries. With an
increasing elasticity of the capital reaction the marginal burden of the capital tax
shifts from the mobile factor capital to the immobile factor labor. Thus, the redis-
tributive usage of capital taxes should as well be expected to be relatively lower in
small countries than in large countries. An asymmetric capital tax equilibrium may
also result from the attempt of capital importing or exporting countries to influence-25-
the interest rate in their favored direction (e.g. Hamada, 1966). Following this line
of argumentation, capital importing regions raise a higher tax rate than capital
exporting regions.
The paper has employed a specific approach to incorporate lobbying by interest
groups in a model of political decision making in a representative democracy. It has
considered lobbying as an attempt to reduce the uncertainty of political parties
concerning political preferences. This specific kind of model leads to a quite
general political support function as a description of equilibrium policy. Although
this model has only considered one special kind of political influence by interest
groups, its results can thus be transferred to other constellations where parties
maximize a weighted aggregate welfare of households and interest groups influ-
ence these weights through lobbying activities.-26-
Appendix
(a) The Influence of the Tax Rate on the Allocation of Capital
This appendix derives the influence of a marginal increase of the domestic capital
tax rate on the international allocation of capital. The following equations have to
be satisfied in the capital market equilibrium:
(A.1)








These equations determine the endogenous variables K
l,s\ and p (i=l...N,
































For all households k=l...n, the terms A\ and B
lk are the same, because the utility
function is assumed to be separable between present and future consumption and
to exhibit constant absolute risk aversion.
2
5 Therefore, the index k in these terms
can be dropped. To derive the effects of an increasing net fiscal burden in coun-









4 The terms c!U and c^ denote present and future consumption of household k in
country i. ;'•
2
5 A separable utility function with constant absolute risk aversion has the following
characteristics: U^
 = U2\ = 0, Un/Ui = const, and #22/^2 "
 const-
2
6 In a symmetric equilibrium all countries choose the same tax rate. Therefore also the
savings of the households, the invested capital stock and the terms F^, F12, A and
B are the same in all countries. The indices 1 and -1 then can be dropped in these












This system can be expressed in matrix-form:
'Fn 0 0 0
0 Fu 0 0
B[F2lnl + t] 0 A 0
0 B[F2lnl + t] 0 A B

















Using Cramer's rule, the following equations can be derived for the influence of a
marginally increasing domestic tax rate on the domestic and foreign capital stock:
dt








Because the production function is assumed to be linear-homogenous and because
in every country the stock of savings equals the stock of invested capital, equation
(A.16) simplifies to the following expression:-29-
dK -l A+Bt
dt
l NFn[A + Bt-Fnn\ , •-^^
























With its property \(/ < 0, the capital market equilibrium also satisfies the condi-
tion for local dynamic stability. This condition can be expressed as follows:
(A.22)-30-
Inserting equations (A.9) and (A.I 1) with d t =0 leads to the following stability
condition for the representative country:
(A.23) 0.
AFn
This condition is satisfied.
b) Comparative Statics
The following comparative static analysis of the tax competition equilibrium is
based on Dixit (1986) who describes the procedure of a comparative static analy-
sis of an oligopoly equilibrium. According to the equations (15) and (16), the first
order condition for the representative party in country i can be represented as
follows:
0. (A.24)
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With t defined as t
l +[N -l\t~
l, equation (A.25) can be transformed as fol-
lows:
[a — b]dt' +bdl — — x
l, ddi
1^. (A.26)




dl = -£ (A.27)
Inserting this expression into equation (A.26) and setting i = l and dt ' =0




1 = a + [N-2]b
d(n
lk [a-f [N-l]b][a-b]' (21)
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c) Second Order Condition, Stability and Slope of the Reaction Function
The second order condition a < 0 as well as the stability condition
a + (N - Y)b < 0 are satisfied with a utility function that is linear in future con-
sumption and a symmetrically distributed capital endowment. The reaction func-
tion of the representative parties then has a positive slope - that means b > 0.
Equation (16) of section 2 depicts the first order condition for the capital tax rate
in equilibrium. It is rewritten here for country 1:
dZ\)
>j N Fnn N
(A.28)
2
7 For simplicity, the adjunct 1 is dropped in the right hand side of equation (22).-32-







1 n V (A.29)
For a constant Uj , the influence of the world interest rate 6n private savings is
the same for all. households j. It is given by the following partial derivative of
equation (5):
ds) _ U2 _ l
dp Un A
(A.30)
Combining this equation with equation (A. 19) leads to the following expression











1 n NFun[A-Fun\ (A.32)
The second order condition a < 0 is thus satisfied. The first condition for stabil-
ity, a + \N — \\b < Ois satisfied for t = 0 as the following equation shows:
2
8 For a constant marginal utility of future consumption, the term B in \|/ vanishes.-33-
dt
] (A.33)
The second condition for stability a + [N - i]b > 0 also holds for a constant
marginal utility of future consumption and a symmetrically distributed capital
endowment, since in this case the slope of the reaction function is positive







From equations (A. 10), (A. 12) and (A. 19) the following expression can be






This term is negative implying a positive term b and therefore also a positively
sloped reaction function.-34-
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